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SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Counsel for the defendants made an incorrect statement in her Course of 
Proceedings, which may be inconsequential, in stating that the "defendants moved 
for dismissal pursuant to l.R.C.P. 41(b)" while in fact defendants moved for 
dismissal pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54 and the Court, sua sponte, ordered dismissal 
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pursuant to IRCP 4 l(b ). Counsel also overlooked reminding this Court in her 
Procedural Overview that appellant had scheduled a hearing of his Motion For 
Leave To Amend on Jan. 30, 2011 that was not ruled upon by the trial court. 
Counsel also failed to note that Appellant had also noticed his Motion for Leave To 
Amend (Orig. Rec. p. 9) for hearing on June 20, 2011 and was precluded from doing 
so on the erroneous basis that the trial Court had previously ruled on that request. 
(Transcript, SC# 39060-2011). 
Counsel states that the trial court ruled on an issue of law as to whether or 
not appellant was entitled to interest on monies previously paid to the defendant 
Nelson. Appellant complained to the trial court that Mr. Nelson had not returned 
the money obtained from appellant after this Court's decision determining that he 
was not entitled to those monies and that such monies were needed in order for 
your appellant to make the deposit required by the attorneys that appellant had 
attempted to engage for assisting in appellant's claim. The trial court informally 
directed counsel to return the monies to appellant. Counsel paid the money to the 
local District Court in lieu of making the money available by payment directly to 
appellant. Thereafter the trial court entered it's order directing a remittance of the 
money deposited without addressing or ruling on an issue as to whether Mr. Nelson 
owed interest on appellant's monies that were converted to his use and by which he 
was unjustly enriched. The process of getting any money back, as ordered by this 
Court, through the District Court took more than an additional three weeks which 
was too late to engage an attorney for assistance. 
ARGUMENT 
Counsel for the defendants has concentrated on the defendants right to 
prevail relying upon failures of your appellant. The defendants, through counsel, 
have not addressed the real issue in this proceeding that is "what is the applicable 
law as relates to the defendants' actions against this minority stockholder and how 
may the Court promote justice in this matter?" The focus on insuring that a just 
result occurs is accomplished by this Court exercising it's right of free review. Idaho 
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policy favors relief in doubtful cases in determining whether or not the trial court 
reasonably exercised it's discretion. Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 731, 228 P. 3d 757. 
The record before this Court, without searching, clearly reflects that the 
defendants, and each of them failed to disclose to plaintiff their activities in early 
2005. The trial Court noted that your appellant should have been aware of the 
situation when H & M's annual report was set out in November of 2005. No 
disagreement with that determination is made except as to the date of mailing. It is 
not informative as to whom or how many shares two or more persons may have 
acquired. That report does not provide "information regarding the transfers" as set 
forth in Finding No. 15 but it did relate to something going on which appellant was 
able to investigate later in returning to Pocatello. A finding of fact that is not 
supported by competent evidence is not binding or conclusive and it's finding effect 
will be set aside on appeal. Ross v. Dorsey, 154 Idaho 836,303 P. 3d 195. 
The trial Court's finding No. 16 is not supported by the evidence as generally 
asserted by the defendants. More significantly what it does tell is that appellant's 
capital was being utilized for the acquisition of stock by the corporation. 
Hemingway & Moser, Inc. is a sub-chapter S corporation and instead of paying 
dividends from profits it retained each individuals share by adding it to his capital 
account. The sale of stock, now known, to Powers, Armstrong and Nelson, increased 
their ownership interest in the remaining "retained earnings" and decreased 
appellant's overall interest. This was certainly not equal opportunity as it in effect 
partially squeezed out your appellant to appellant's detriment and damage. The trial 
court should have entered comparable findings as to the overall gain by each on the 
defendants by their secretive action. For example the interest of Armstrong and that 
of appellant were equal for many years until May 2005 at 9.41 % of the outstanding 
stock. After September 30, 2005 Armstrong was awarded not only the same 
increase as the trial court determined that I received for a total of 10.368664% 
(Aug. Ex. 3) but also approximately an additional 14.5% of what we each had 
resulting in a gain to over a 12% of total capital interest (Aug. Ex. 1010) for 
Armstrong. This difference is also manifested in augmented Exs. 2 & 1013. The 
District Court should have made findings of fact as to the gains of each of the three 
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defendants in order to conclude that appellant had incurred no loss. The 
consideration and effect of findings of fact or failure to make findings is subject to 
free review. Clayon v. Zebe. 153 Idaho 228, 280 P.3d 731. The law recognizes that 
anytime there is an increase of stock shares to other owners that a loss occurs to the 
minority holder who is not allowed an equal opportunity to participate in the stock 
acquisition. 
As noted the trial court also failed to enter a comparison of appellant's token 
gain as against the gain obtained by the corporation secretary and general manager, 
Ron Nelson. He owned 22 shares of stock in May of 2005 or 4.6% of ownership, 
{Aug. 1011). He was permitted by Powers and Armstrong to purchase 20 shares 
from Prater stock that resulted in almost doubling his ownership. He also earned 
five shares of stock at the end of the fiscal year pursuant to his employment 
agreement. The trial court's finding on these matters is not supported by the 
evidence. A party may challenge the sufficiency of evidence to support a trial court's 
findings without having presented that contention to the trial court. Vendelin v. 
Costco Wholesale Corp .• 140 Idaho 416, 95 P. 3d 34. This substantial and competent 
evidence, that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion, ( Bradford v. 
Roche Moving and Storage. Inc. 147 Idaho 733,215 P. 3d 453), supports a 
conclusion other than the conclusion of the trial court which is that plaintiff was not 
damaged as asserted by the defendants. This documentary evidence was prepared 
by the defendants and clearly reflects that each of them, from and after Sept. 30, 
2005, obtained for themselves an extra and greater advantage over the right to 
obtain and receive earnings from the corporation. Where a majority or controlling 
shareholders in a close corporation breach " their heightened fiduciary duty" 
{emphasis supplied) by utilizing their majority control of the corporation to their 
own advantage, without providing a minority shareholder with an equal 
opportunity to benefit, is actionable. Mccann v. Mccann. 152 Idaho 809. 275 P. 3d 
824. ICA 30-1-1430(2)(b). 
Defendants urge this Court to confirm the trial court's decision of dismissal of 
appellant's claim as being precluded by the statute of limitations. The trial court 
recognized the legal theory of the tolling of a statute of limitations by non-disclosure 
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but incorrectly applied it in this proceeding. The trial court made findings, Nos. 8-
13 that the breach of the contract by Prater occurred on May 2, 2005. (Cone. 2 & 3) 
and that such date was the "trigger" of the breach. First of all appellant would urge 
this Court to determine that the meeting of May 2nd was no more than the "loading" 
of the breach and that the "trigger" of the breach was on Sept. 30th• It alone activated 
the breach. The following day was the first day on which Ron Nelson was to be 
issued his five shares of stock from which he could thereafter receive stock benefits. 
It was as of October 1 that the accountant, Mr. Armstrong, utilized the end of Sept. 
30th as the date on which each persons share for the year 2005 was financially 
determined. It was the date on which the fiscal year end was activated. Secondly, as 
in the same situation as the purported meeting of February 2nd, there was no call of 
the meeting and no notice of any type, before or after that date, to appellant. 
Without a call or notice the meeting is without legal standing. Thirdly, the purported 
minutes themselves speak to the fact that no meeting was called and defendants rely 
upon the purported minute entry to support their illegal activity. The minute entry 
was signed by the defendant Nelson as the secretary while in fact a waiver of notice 
cannot be effected without the signature of each individual stockholder as was done 
for the meetings depicted in augmented Exhibits 4 and 5. Appellant contends that 
the trial Court and the defendants cannot cause a statute of limitation to relate back 
to an invalid or illegal situation. The appropriate time to commence the statute of 
limitations is at some date in December 2005 when appellant should have 
discovered the improper action of the undisclosed activities of the fiduciary 
defendants. Fourth, in 2005 Idaho law, ICA 30-1-6, provided specifically how stock 
redemption could be accomplished. As noted in Taylor v. AIA Service Corp., 151 
Idaho 552,261 P. 3d 829, the primary purpose of a stock redemption statute is to 
protect minority shareholders and creditors from corporation mismanagement by 
preventing boards of directors from drawing corporate assets. Taylor continues to 
tell us that in order for a shareholders' vote to authorize the use of capital surplus it 
must also set forth explicitly that the surplus be utilized for redemption. The mere 
authorization of stock redemption does not suffice. In this situation there was not 
even any capital surplus on which to pay for a redemption. H & M had no monies 
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with which to redeem stock so it appears that accountant Armstrong determined 
the monies belonging to the individual stockholders could be utilized. Even an 
explicit recitation of that was not set forth in the purported motion for stock 
redemption was made. The District Court's conclusion of law that the agreement 
with Prater was valid is contrary to law and conclusions of law are subject to free 
review. Jazzo v. Camas County, 151 Idaho 790,264 P. 3d 857. 
The trial court also made findings and conclusions of law in respect to his 
determination that each of the defendants had no responsibility to appellant in 
respect to the stockholders agreement. Contrary to defendants contentions that the 
record supports the trial court's conclusion that the defendants had no obligation or 
duty to the plaintiff it is readily apparent that the trial court did not correctly apply 
Idaho law to this situation. The trial court found that intentional fraud was required 
to be proved to establish liability. In Idaho good faith and fair dealing are implied 
obligations of every contract. Luzzo v. Western Sur. Co. 107 Idaho 790, 264 P. 3d 
337. This Court directed the trial court to address this issue on remand and then 
interpreted the question of good faith and fair dealing to require intentional acts. A 
reasonable person could readily determine that omissions of duties does not require 
an intent and that findings and conclusions of a breach of contract is more 
appropriate in this case. Furthermore, as stated in McCann, a corporate director has 
a fiduciary duty to both the corporation and to shareholders. Both Armstrong and 
Powers were corporate directors with that responsibility while Nelson was the 
general manager with responsibilities to the corporation and stockholders pursuant 
to his employment agreement that also has a covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
In it's interpretation of the stockholders agreement the trial court entered Finding 
No. 20 that totally gives no consideration to the application of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. The stockholder contract was an agreement between the 
parties and established only the obligation of the seller as focused on by the trial but 
it also bestows benefits for each party. If a party violates, nullifies or significantly 
impairs any benefit of the contract that party has violated the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. Washington Federal Savings v. Van Engelen. 153 Idaho 
648, 289 P. 3d 50. A party has a duty to speak and when the accountant, on and 
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after the end of each fiscal year, gave himself and each of the other defendants more 
monies than they were entitled as a result of the invalid transaction with Prater 
your appellant was deprived of a pro rata monetary benefit to his capital account as 
had been distributed for many years. Each of these benefit deprivations is a separate 
incident and the statute of limitations claimed by the defendants is inapplicable. It 
would be an injustice for a court of equity, as is this Court, to apply the five year 
statute of limitations cited by defendants against a single one of the distributions 
after September 30, 2005. 
In this proceeding, immediately after remand, Judge Stoker placed this case 
on the trial calendar. He did not note that the case was not at issue as to the 
defendants Powers and Armstrong. He also did not note that there was a pending 
Motion for Leave To Amend in the Court record. He also had a disqualification notice 
filed by your appellant after remand. Nothing appeared in his order to appear for a 
pre-trial conference reflecting any consideration of these factors. The entry of the 
order to appear for a pretrial conference without consideration of all of the facts 
was an abuse of discretion. Appellant thereafter filed a motion for disqualification 
for cause. Appellant did execute a pretrial agreement prepared by defendants' to 
avoid an expensive mandatory trip to Twin Falls as ordered by Judge Stoker. Judge 
Stoker denied appellant's motion and then disqualified himself. Judge Bevan then 
assigned this matter to himself and executed approval of the stipulation between 
the parties. Appellant, on Dec. 11th, 2012 was able get his Motion For Leave To 
Amend together with motions for leave to add additional parties and for an 
enlargement of time scheduled for Jan. 7th, 2013. (Rec. p. 12). That hearing was 
vacated and rescheduled for Jan. 22nd• On Jan. 22nd appellant appeared before Judge 
Brody, substituting for Judge Bevan, on appellant's Motion For Leave To Amend filed 
on Dec. 20th, 2010. Judge Brody denied appellant's motion on the basis that 
appellant had taken 23 months from it's first scheduled date for hearing to bring the 
matter then currently before the trial court Judge Brody was grossly mistaken and 
failed to consider, as did Judge Stoker, that the case was not at issue. Had Judge 
Stoker not placed the matter on the trial schedule appellant could have filed an 
amended complaint as to the defendants Powers and Armstrong without leave of 
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the court. The case was at issue as to the defendant Nelson and leave of court was 
required in that regard. Another major factor that was not considered by Judge 
Brody was that the trial court was without jurisdiction from the time a Notice of 
Appeal was filed on August 1, 2011 until July 20, 2012, the very day that Judge 
Stoker placed the proceeding, without analysis, on the trial calendar. Judge Brody's 
order of denial of appellant's request for a leave to amend was more than an abuse 
of discretion. It actually was a" manifest abuse of discretion" (emphasis 
supplied) requiring reversal of the judgment. 
The defendants argument that it was appropriate for the trial court to deny 
leave to amend borders on an argument that one does not have a constitutional 
right to a fair trial or that a full and complete trial on all issues between the parties 
does not deprive one of justice. More significantly is that Judge Stoker inquired of 
counsel as to a matter of communication between client and counsel and then when 
appellant sought to argue the motion for leave to amend, that had not been ruled 
upon, he denied the same. The only time that appellant had an opportunity to 
address the motion for leave to amend that had been filed very early in these 
proceedings was on January 22, 2013. This Court has always maintained that great 
liberality should be give to allow a right to amend one's claim. The trial court 
declined to permit any amendment that might more fully set out all of the issues 
between the parties. Your appellant contends that the denial of the right to amend 
was unjust. Appellant also sought relief from the trial Court by virtue of the 
defendant Nelson's failure to return monies as directed by this Court. To support 
the need for an amendment appellant filed motions in effect seeking a later trial date 
that were denied. Appellant's motions that had been set for hearing were vacated 
more than once with final rulings not coming until shortly before the scheduled trial 
date that plaintiff sought to have reset. Each of those denials handicapped counsel 
and were an abuse of discretion in that consideration was given to the defendants 
over consideration to your appellant which appellant believes each should be 
considered as an abuse of discretion. 
After trial, on application for attorney fees by respondents, appellant 
objected on several grounds including that the fee claims included fees paid to 
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individuals who did not appear in the proceedings and that appellant had offsets, 
including interest against both Nelson and Powers. Fees were claimed that they are 
due as being a commercial transaction. Not all commercial transactions are 
considered as requiring a fee award particularly where the transaction is for a 
personal matter. The offer of sale of stock by Prater was a personal matter and not 
an arms length dispute. It was obviously for the convenience of Prater that any 
agreement was attempted. As such attorney fees should not have been awarded 
pursuant to ICA section 12-120(3). No hearing was provided in regard by to other 
issues by the trial court which appellant contends should have been held and 
without a hearing the ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The proceedings before the District Court were not held with the thought in 
mind that the trial court should consider issues, including some occurring 
subsequent to the filing of the complaint. The District Judge did not give "liberal 
construction" to plaintiff's complaint or to plaintiff's attempt to file an amended 
complaint. The stock redemption from Prater should be declared to be a nullity and 
each of the three defendants should be held accountable for their abuse of the 
shareholders agreement. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
JOHN B. KUGLER I ! 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that two true and bound copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief was served on the respondents this 16th TH day of May, 2014 by mailing the 
same to Brooke B. Redmond, P.O. Box 226, Twin Falls,ID 83303. 
JOHN1B. KUGLER 
I 
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